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Abstract: This text aims to analyze whether constitutionalizing a secession procedure is an adequate way to 
harmonize the roles of constitutional legality and democracy in regard to the secular territorial debate in Spain. 
The main reason for a positive answer to that question is the current blocking of the territorial debate in multi-
ethnic Spain and the view of secession procedure as a legal tool to strengthen the binding force of the Spanish 
Constitution, threatened by separatist movements. As long as the constitutional amendment procedure helps in 
democratic States to preserve and safeguard the differentiation of the legal system, becoming a legal path to 
express the will of the people's constituent power as a legally constituent-constituted amendment power, and as 
long as the Spanish Constitution lacks absolute substantial limitations upon the constitutional amendment, in 
particular national unity, a right to secede may be constitutionalized using the aggravated constitutional 
amendment procedure of art. 168 SC. The future constitutional clause on secession, which should be coherent 
with the remaining constitutional principles and values, will constitutionalize the external right to self-
determination of the Spanish Peoples, nowadays organized in Autonomous Communities, and will allow them 
unilaterally counter the binding force of the Spanish Constitution over their territories. This secessionist 
decision shall take place in two decisive steps through a constitutional amendment procedure set by the 
constituent power of the Spanish People: initiative one by the qualified majority of the regional Parliament's 
representatives; and decision one, voted in a referendum by the qualified majority of the Territory's electors. In 
between these two stages an intermediate negotiation phase of two years should take place, in which the 
seceding territory and the Spanish central Government must negotiate in order to find another non-secessionist 
type of constitutional amendment that could prevent the secession or, if this is not possible, the concrete 
conditions of the secession. 
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1. Why constitutionalizing secession? 
 1.1 The blocking of the territorial debate in Spain 
 Following Peoples's and Bailey's  definition of ethnicity (2011, 387) Spain can be 
considered today a pluri-ethnic State, containing not different sovereign nations or peoples, 
but self-governed Autonomous Communities, with their own cultural and political identity, 
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that live and have lived together for centuries under a common political structure and seek 
different degrees of self-determination, from the enjoyment of political autonomy within the 
Spanish State to secession in order to build a new sovereign State.   
 The Spanish Constitution of 1978 (SC) reflects to a great extent this idea of pluri-
ethnicity in its art. 2, which recognizes the right of nationalities and regions composing Spain 
to enjoy political autonomy within the unity of the Spanish Nation and at the same time 
recognizes and protects their foral  rights in its Additional Provision nr. 1 (historical self-
government rights of the different territories of the Spanish Monarchy, dating back to the 
Middle Ages). Which nationalities or regions are entitled to access to political autonomy is 
laid down in art. 143 SC, combining an ethnic and a will  element: bordering provinces 
with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics, insular territories and provinces 
with a historic regional status may accede to self-government and form Self-governing 
Communities in conformity with the provisions contained in this Part and in the respective 
Statutes .  
 The self-government aims of these Spanish territorial communities have been 
developed and extended in the last 35 years with the help of the provisions of Title VIII SC, 
the Autonomy Statutes, the Acts foreseen in Art. 150 SC and all the case-law of the 
Constitutional Court, but not for the first time in Spanish history this path has not helped to 
put an end to the territorial debate in Spain and once again we now face a situation where 
some parts of the State aim for a degree of self-determination not covered by the 
constitutional framework, not even with the allowed constitutional mutations (in the sense of 
Böckenförde 1993, 6) that have taken place in the last years.  
 That is why it seems reasonable to look for constitutional tools that may help to 
reorganise the territorial issue and that contribute to creating a more stable solution than the 
one represented by the State of Autonomies .  Taking into account the evolution of support 
for secession since 2002 showed by Grau (2011, 200) and reflected in the  political surveys of 
the Basque Country (http://www.ehu.eus/documents/1457190/1525260/EB+mayo+14+web.pdf) and 
Catalonia (http://ceo.gencat.cat/ceop/AppJava/loadFile?fileId=23053&fileType=1) in  recent years, it is 
not clear that only a constitutional amendment transforming Spain into a formal  asymmetric 
Federal State could be enough to stop the growing desire of many citizens of those historical 
nationalities to identify self-determination with the right to secede, no matter how real the 
historical and legal background for this expectation. And a unilateral right to secede is not 
covered by the Spanish Constitution according to the recent Judgment of the Constitutional 
Court (STC) 42/2014, of 25 of March, Grounds 3º-4º, because it is, as such, incompatible with 
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the attachment of the national  sovereignty to the Spanish People (art. 1.2 SC) and with the 
indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation (art. 2 SC). Therefore the secession of any part of the 
Spanish realm is for now legally conditioned to a constitutional amendment decided by 
referendum of the whole Spanish people (art. 168 SC). 
 Besides this, the right to secede is not generally recognized either by the international 
law, as the Supreme Court of Canada in Quebec's case (Reference Re Secession of Quebec, 
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 217) and, in our country, Rodríguez-Zapata Pérez (1999, 107-108) have 
pointed out; even though it is also true, as Mancini (2012, 487) remarks, that neither does 
international law exclude the possibility of this right to secede being legalized by the States. 
According to a widely accepted interpretation of art. 1 ICCPR and art. 1 ICSER (Raic, 2002, 
228; Medina Ortega 2014, 145; Mangas Martín 2013, 50-53), the right to self-determination 
of peoples only grants the internal self-determination (political autonomy) of non-colonial 
peoples, which are not under the power of a foreign State, but does not grant their external 
self-determination (secession). This interpretation follows UN Resolution 2625 (XXV) 
containing the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations as the 
only way to harmonize the right to self-determination of peoples and the principle of respect 
for the territorial integrity of States, which is only subordinated to the latter and therefore 
accepts external self-determination and secession only as a remedy-right  of non-colonial 
peoples (according to the classification of Buchanan 1997, 34) for the cases where the State to 
which  they belong does not respect their right to internal self-determination or the equal 
human rights of their citizens, which is not the case of Spain's nationalities and regions. The 
Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the case of Kosovo A/64/881 of 2008 has not 
changed this interpretation, inasmuch as the Court does not declare the illegality of Kosovo's 
secession according to International Law, but does not declare either that generally peaceful 
secession is generally legal as long as it depends also on the internal constitutional law of the 
State concerned (Medina Ortega 2014, 167).  
 In sum we can conclude that the territorial political debate in Spain is legally blocked 
(López Basaguren 2013, 99) and this blockade is a highly dangerous situation for the efficacy 
of the constitutional system, as long as it is possible that some Spanish Autonomous 
Communities may try to fulfill their external self-government expectations, though 
peacefully, beyond the constitutionally provided means, and the Spanish central institutions 
may rely only on the need to comply with binding law and threaten the use of federal coercion 
(art. 155 SC), without  seeking a democratic and at the same time legal way out of this 
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blockade. For that reason we will explore the possibilities of constitutionalizing a secession 
procedure as a functional way to eliminate this situation, harmonizing the respect for 
constitutional legality and for a modern open democratic principle. 
 
 1.2 Constitutionalizing secession in order to strengthen the binding force of the 
Constitution 
 An open constitutional democracy like Spain should not close itself to the possibility 
of internalizing the expectation of part of the State territory to secede, because this would run 
against its functional role of stabilizing political expectations, especially if there is an attempt 
to impose this expectation by illegal means and the legal system has to pay the price in terms 
of democratic legitimacy of the coercive imposition upon institutions and thousands of 
citizens the legality of the blockade. The safeguarding of the legal system s binding force 
should lead the Constitution to leave open or even institutionalize legal ways that may allow 
and at the same time control this expectation of external self-determination, whenever there is 
a clear overwhelming majority of citizens of a territory wishing to secede.  
 Contrary to the material understanding of the normativity of the Constitution of 
scholars such as Ruipérez Alamillo (2013, 89), we think that taking the normativity of the 
Constitution seriously implies that the preservation of its binding force as a legal form 
(regardless of its specific content) and the correlative efficacy of the whole legal system have 
to take priority over the enforcement of a particular constitutional provision, no matter how 
important it is politically. Therefore looking for democratic constitutional arrangements 
between the territorial minorities and the State s majority, which could help to preserve 
respect for the Constitution as the highest law of the country, is more valuable than the 
preservation of the territorial integrity of the State or the unity of a sovereign people. In other 
words, if the legal system is, according to Luhmann (1993, 131), a self-referring and a 
positive social system, it is inclined to organize norm production in a democratic way in order 
to preserve its functional differentiation. The confrontation between constitutional legality 
and its democratic principle is always the consequence of a weakening of the former through 
a pre- and meta-legal understanding of the latter on the basis of attaching sovereignty to a pre-
constitutional people (German, Spanish, Catalan, Basque, etc ), as for instance does Isensee 
(1989, 705). As long as democracy is the type of structuring of the legal system that best 
reflects its positivity and self-reference (Bastida Freijedo 1998, 389), it cannot be understood 
as the pure majority ruling nor be blind to the existence of a territorial minority which might 
seek secession. The modern pluralistic understanding of democracy since Kelsen (1920, 36) 
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requires constitutional democracies to accommodate as much as possible the expectations of 
the majority and the expectations of the minorities, and this need is especially compelling in 
territorial decentralized States if the minority within the State s population represents or can 
become a majority within a territorial collectivity of the State. As the Supreme Court of 
Canada stated in its Decision Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 254, 
democracy is fundamentally connected to substantive goals; most importantly, the promotion 
of self-government and in federal systems accommodates cultural and group identities besides 
the majority rule. That would apply as well to Spain, where democracy is a constitutional 
value as much as the decision to territorially decentralize power (for now by means of 
Autonomous Communities). 
In other words, in highly complex modern societies a democratic legal system can 
only preserve its legitimacy, understood as the generalized readiness to accept normative 
decisions regardless of their content (Luhmann 1978, 28), provided that it has legal 
procedures channeling secessionist expectations. The imposition of the present constitutional 
law with the help of federal coercion (art. 155 SC) or with the intervention of the armed 
forces (art. 8 SC) does not grant any legitimacy to the legal system, because it merely 
eliminates the expressions of the secession challenge but not the roots of the challenge itself. 
Coercion at this level of the legal system makes it more rigid but not necessarily more stable 
in terms of efficacy, which is the purpose of democratic legitimacy, because the State s 
living-together has to be imposed with the threat of the use of force. 
 The sovereignty of the People plays a better role in the democratic legitimacy of the 
legal system if its legal expression, the Constitution s amending power, has an amending 
procedure allowing those territories hoping to secede to break free democratically and legally 
with the Spanish legal system (Aláez Corral 2012, 415). Looking for general, long-term, 
democratic and legal constitutional arrangements, this would require an amendment of the 
Spanish Constitution establishing a new special amending procedure for the peaceful and 
legal external self-determination of the existing Autonomous Communities; that is, 
constitutionalizing a formal procedure of secession that releases the seceding territory of the 
binding force of the mother State s Constitution, as already proposed in general terms by 
Wood (1981, 110) Tosi (2007, 293) and Buchanan (2013). Such a new secession procedure 
would express the democratic binding force of the legal system, on the one hand because it 
would be flexible enough to provide for a legal path to unilateral secession and would not 
allow only coercive repression of peaceful secession expectations, and on the other hand 
because it would reinforce the stability of the legal system, depriving of legitimacy the 
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attempts at secession beyond legal channels. The supposed sovereignty of the Catalan, Basque 
or whatever Spanish people could only be exercised through the constitutionalized secession 
procedure, and conversely the sovereignty of the Spanish People could only be recalled to 
comply with the conditions established in that constitutionalized procedure.  
This proposed way out of the blockade is not just to organize or allow a non-binding 
consultation to know the political opinion of the Catalan, Basque, etc  citizens regarding 
their identity and self-determination, nor to let the central Spanish Government and the 
Spanish People through a referendum in accordance with the former consultation amend the 
constitution to make directly effective the secession of some part of the country. That would 
only mean a hetero-determination and not the external self-determination sought by the 
secession procedure, and would in any case be a short-term solution for a specific and serious 
situation. 
 
 Some constitutional Scholars have argued against constitutionalizing a secession 
procedure (Sáiz Arnáiz, 2006-2007, 36-42; Sunstein, 1991, 634-635). These arguments are, 
for instance, that such a secession procedure would contradict the will of stability and 
permanence of the Constitution, because constitutionalism is the opposite to secession; that it 
could create more serious political or ethnic conflicts than the ones the procedure would try to 
address (the political nature of secession that would make impossible the constitutional 
review of such secession clause before the Courts); that having such a procedure would 
reduce the possibilities of deliberative debate in order to reach a political compromise 
between the parts and the whole of the federal Government, with the related increased 
blocking of the adoption of decisions concerning ordinary political life; or  the risks of 
political blackmailing and strategic political handling by the territories threatening secession, 
which could endanger long-term governance. 
Regarding the first argument it can be counter-argued that the stability and 
permanence of the Constitution they refer to is that of a material Constitution, that is, of 
concrete constitutional binding contents, not that of the formal constitution as a higher law-
form that aims to preserve itself regardless of its particular constitutional contents and its 
specific territorial or personal scope of efficacy. Indeed, the Constitution must be understood 
in contemporary constitutionalism as an evolutionary outcome of the differentiation of the 
legal system (Luhmann 1993, 470). As a consequence of this, the constitutional amending 
power becomes the power to domesticate and therefore legalize revolution, that is, to allow 
the continuity of the legal system however profound would be its substantial transformation, 
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including a revolutionary reduction of its territorial scope of application. Regarding the 
conflicts argument, it can be said that, although it could have been politically too risky, in 
terms of governance stability, to introduce a secession clause at some stages of our history as 
was the case of the Spanish transition in 1975-1978-, after more than 35 years of 
constitutional democracy it does not seem rash to explore new ways to get out of the blockade 
of the territorial issue and constitutionalizing secession seems to be an appropriate option. 
Regarding the political nature of secession, it can be said for now that every constitutional 
issue not only secession- is of a political nature and the higher or lower constituent 
consensus on it does not determine the possibility of its constitutional review. So, for 
instance, the Spanish Constitutional Court has intensely and decisively adjudicated through 
specific judicial review procedures on the politically open constitutional provisions on 
territorial decentralization, but conversely has not done the same on the highly specific 
constitutional provisions on the Monarchy, whose judicial review lacks a specific procedure 
for that purpose. Besides that, the absence of a secession clause has not prevented the judicial 
review of some practices of the Catalan Government calling for a people s consultation on 
external self-determination on the basis of competence in this question, concept of a 
referendum, sovereignty and democracy, etc , in all cases issues as much political in nature 
as secession (see STC 103/2008, of 11 September, F.J. 4º and STC 42/2014, of 25 March, 
FF.JJ. 3º-4º, as well as the more recent STC 31/2015 and STC 32/2015, both of 25 February). 
 Finally, regarding the political blocking, blackmailing and governance stability risks, 
as Weinstock (2001, 182) and Shorten (2014, 99) point out, those arguments can be 
diminished if the constitutionalized secession clause is a qualified majority one, legally 
designed to force those in favour of secession to make a rational assessment regarding the 
cost/benefit of seceding or remaining within the federal State and negotiating with the federal 
institutions, taking into account the constitutional hurdles of secession and its impact over its 
own political position within their territory. 
  
2. How to constitutionalize secession in Spain 
 2.1 Through constitutional amendment notwithstanding the national unity 
clause 
The Spanish Constitution explicitly determines which constitutional powers and 
competences belong to every Governmental Institution and does not share between the 
territorially decentralized and the central Government institutions the power to call for a 
referendum on self-determination. Therefore there is no place for a non-formal secession 
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the Autonomous Communities with competences, like calling for a referendum on self-
determination, which have not been decentralized according to art. 149.1ª.32 SC and remain 
in the hands of the central institutions (López Basaguren, 2013, 95). This interpretation has 
been definitely confirmed by the last case-law of the Spanish Constitutional Court (STC 
31/2015 and STC 32/2015, of 25 February as well as STC 42/2014, of 25 March). The 
general provision of a secession procedure must be introduced by means of a constitutional 
amendment. 
The supremacy clause established by the Spanish Constitution in its art.9.1 expresses 
without any doubt the positivity of the Spanish legal system and is fully confirmed by the 
provision of two aggravated amendment procedures in Title X of the Constitution. The first 
one, for the ordinary constitutional amendments (art. 167), and the second ultra-aggravated 
procedure, for the total change of the Constitution, or an amendment affecting the core 
the territorial integrity as well as the attachment of the national sovereignty to the Spanish 
people (art. 168) belong. In other words, the Spanish Constitutional system, in order to 
preserve its efficacy, institutionalizes ways of change and admits the total amendability of its 
constitutional content, including the addition of a secession procedure. 
 
Certainly, it could have been possible for the Spanish Constitution to have prohibited 
expressly or impliedly the amendment of concrete constitutional provisions through the so 
such as art. 79.3 German Constitution (regarding human dignity and 
the fundamental principles of a democratic social state, rule of law and federalism), art. 139 
Italian Constitution and art. 89 French Constitution (regarding the democratic republican form 
of government), art. 193.4 and art. 194.2 Swiss Constitution (regarding international ius 
territorial unity) have done. In all these cases the legal amendment of protected issues is not 
possible and could only take place through an extra-legal exercise of the original constituent 
power. Even though more and more countries include such eternity clauses in their 
Constitutions (Roznai 2013, 665-670) those provisions can only be fully effective if they are 
self-referring and they apply also to themselves (Aláez Corral 2000, 211-221). Otherwise it 
could be possible to change the prohibited content through a two-step amendment: first 
eliminating or altering the scope of the eternity clause and then amending the no longer 
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blocked constitutional content (Biscaretti di Ruffia 1949, 165). So, for instance, as long as the 
US Supreme Court since Dillon v. Gloss (256 U.S. 368 (1921)) abandoned the idea of implied 
substantive limitations upon the amendment power of Art. V US Constitution, a secession 
right could be constitutionalized in the US Constitution, even though the present text does not 
contain such a right for now (de Miguel Bárcena 2014, 20), as the Supreme Court expressly 
affirmed in Texas v. White (74 U.S. 700 (1869)).  
    
According to a material understanding of the Spanish Constitution, it has been argued 
against the possibility of secession via constitutional amendment (Tajadura Tejada 2009, 380-
382) that the national unity is an implied substantial limitation to the Constitutional amending 
power and that therefore secession could only take place extra-legally by means of the 
original constituent power of the Spanish People (Ruipérez Alamillo 2013, 131-133). Two 
textual counter-arguments speak against the existence of this implied limitation. First, Title X 
of the Spanish Constitution does not mention any substantial limitation upon constitutional 
amendment, unlike what happens in all of the other above-mentioned legal systems with 
Portuguese Constitution) or impliedly (art. 5 related to art. 139 Italian Constitution, as 
interpreted by Sentenza 1146/1988 of the Italian Constitutional Court) within them.  
Secondly, on the grounds that art. 168 SC allows a total amendment of the 
Constitution or an amendment affecting the constitutional provisions of the Preliminary Title, 
where art. 2 of the indissoluble national unity is placed. Both constitutional provisions should 
be interpreted in the most harmonic way (practical concordance) and consequently, as 
Rodríguez-Zapata Pérez (1999, 118), Saiz Arnáiz (2006-2007, 37) or López Basaguren (2013, 
88) for Spain and Modugno (1999, 1013) for Italy have also concluded, the national unity 
limits the under-constitutional implementation of the territorial decentralization via the 
Autonomous Communities (STC 31/2010, 28 June, FFJJ 3º, 7º, 12º), but does not limit the 
ultra-aggravated constitutional amending power (STC 103/2008, of 11 September FJ 4º; STC 
42/2014, 25 March, FJ 3º). The unity of the Spanish Nation does not represents the (supra) 
legal foundation of the State and the Constitution itself, because, even though the (Spanish, 
legal concept they are created only by their recognition in the Spanish Constitution or in the 
Statutes of Autonomy (STC 42/2014, 25 March, FJ 3º).  
The fact that the Spanish Armed Forces, according to art. 8 SC
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does not change any point in the above-mentioned argument. Precisely because one of the 
possibility of legally changing or eliminating the mandate of the national unity, the territorial 
integrity of the State is not related to a metaphysical and supra-constitutional understanding of 
national unity, but to national unity as it has been characterized by the constitutional order. 
And as we have seen this is an amendable type of national unity (STC 103/2008, 11 
September, FJ 4º). 
 
2.2 The need to follow the ultra-aggravated amendment procedure 
After clarifying that nothing withstands constitutionalizing a new secession procedure, 
it is necessary now to ask how it can be done, in other words which amending procedure has 
to be followed for that purpose. 
However, before this, it should be said that we are talking about formal constitutional 
amendment procedures, not about any update of the historical-material constitutional concept, 
which understands it as a political agreement between the foral territories (among them 
Catalonia or the Basque Country) and the Spanish Monarchy, understood as pre-constitutional 
bodies (Herrero de Miñon 1998, 88, 320). Such a constitutional understanding is not only 
inadequate from the point of view of the functional differentiation of politics and law, but also 
deeply undemocratic from the point of view of the equal and plural right of individuals to 
decide on the type of territorial organization they want to live in. Certainly, the additional 
Provision Nr.1 SC safeguards the historical self-government rights of the foral territories, but  
according to the Spanish Constitutional Court (STC 32/1981 of 2 February, F.J. 4º; STC 
76/1988 of 26 April, FF.JJ, 4º y 5º; y STC 159/1993 of 6 May, F. J. 6º) those rights can only 
be updated with due respect to the framework of the Spanish Constitution and their Statutes of 
Autonomy, in no case  superseding them (Corcuera Atienza 1984, 37-38; Solozabal 
Echavarría 1989, 124). Therefore, even accepting the dubious premise that those foral 
territories have ever been independent States, the Spanish Constitution does not grant them 
any right to change their constitutional status re-negotiating outside the constitutional 
amendment procedures their political status (Rodríguez-Zapata Pérez 1999, 120), because this 
would undermine the supremacy of the Spanish Constitution. 
Regarding the adequate formal amendment procedure, the choice between the two 
procedures provided for in Title X SC depends on the normative impact of the proposed 
amendment. Constitutionalizing a secession procedure would allow the loss of supremacy of 
the Constitution over part of the Spanish territory and therefore over the citizens and 
 11 
Governmental institutions thereof. This affects doubtlessly the core content of the territorial 
and personal scope of art. 9.1 SC (Spanish Constitution supremacy clause), the indissoluble 
unity of the Spanish Nation and the type of political decentralization of powers provided by 
art. 2 SC, as well as the attachment by art. 1.2 SC of national sovereignty to a unified Spanish 
People (STC 31/2010, of 28 June, F.J. 12º). 
All these provisions are included in the Preliminary Title of the Spanish Constitution 
and a new constitutional amendment procedure for secession will affect them. Art. 168 SC 
provides for an ultra-aggravated amendment procedure whenever the proposed constitutional 
amendment affects (among others) the provisions of the Preliminary Title, even when there is 
no textual change to any of them but their core content results directly or indirectly affected 
(Aláez Corral 2000, 333). For that reason, it could not be constitutionally possible, as 
however suggests Payero López (2014, 24), to override that ultra-rigid procedure by a two-
step sequence: first amending art. 168 SC in order to exclude from it the Preliminary Title 
affected provisions by a secession, and secondly amending the constitution for secession 
through the more flexible procedure of 167 SC. 
Art. 168 SC. designates an ultra-aggravated constitutional amendment procedure that 
combines elements of democratic respect for minorities, self-determination of groups and 
individuals and the sovereignty of the Spanish People. So, according to art. 166 and art. 87.1 
and 2 SC, the initiative for constitutionalizing a secession clause could be taken either by the 
central institutions or by the territories through the Parliaments of the Autonomous 
Communities (STC 42/2014, of 25 March, FF.JJ. 3º-4º.). But as far as the decision affects 
common interests of all the Spanish People, the final decision can only be taken by central 
State institutions in terms of qualified majorities (2/3 of the Members of each House of 
Parliament twice in a double lecture with a general election in between), and by the electors of 
the whole Spanish People in a national referendum.  
This amendment procedure however has some weak points regarding federalism and 
democracy: first, the lack of territorial representation of the secession-involved territories at 
the Senate, which in contrast with its constitutional role (art. 69 SC) does not express the view 
of the Autonomous Communities regarding the common interests at stake with such a 
secession clause. Secondly, there is certain  
long as according to art. 166 SC the amendment procedure cannot be started through the 
SC the central institutions can block any 
consultation to the citizens of the affected territories by not giving it their mandatory consent 
(Ridao i Martí 2014, 115). Furthermore, according to the STC 103/2008, of 11 September, 
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F.J. 4º such a consultation should not even be allowed by the central Government, as it deals 
with an issue (secession) over which art. 168 SC has entrusted the whole Spanish people to 
decide through a national referendum at the end of the amendment procedure (Castellá 
Andreu 2014, 45). 
 
3. The content of a future secession clause 
 3.1 Adequacy to the fundamental principles of the constitutional system 
Before focusing on the content of the secession clause, it must be mentioned that such 
a clause should adequate to the fundamental principles of the constitutional system (Buchanan 
2013, 208), because otherwise the legal system would lack internal coherence. 
Constitutionalizing secession is thought to improve the stability and efficacy of the 
constitutional system as a whole in territorially decentralized States, not to split it up. For that 
reason, conversely, the territorial organization of the State must be designed previously or at 
the same time in order to have a chilling effect  regarding secession, which has to be used 
only as ultima ratio and in order to be consistent with the existence of a secession clause in 
the Constitution. If the right to secede is constitutionalized in order to satisfy the right to self-
determination of the different Spanish ethnic groups, whose unilateral will would be given the 
effect of modifying the personal and territorial scope of the Spanish Constitution, one pre-
condition for the internal coherence of the legal system is that sovereignty is not politically 
attached to a unified, ethnically homogeneous People or nation. In other words, it would be 
dysfunctional to constitutionalize the right to secede but maintain the type of territorial 
decentralization of the State of Autonomies and the attachment of the national sovereignty to 
a unified Spanish People (art. 1.2 and art. 2 SC). As the Spanish Constitutional Court (STC 
anish 
People is sovereign, exclusively and indivisibly, no other subject or State body or any part of 
the people can be endowed with sovereign status by a public power. An act issued by a public 
ompetence of the people of an 
Autonomous Community also denies national sovereignty, which, according to the 
Constitution, can only be held by the entire Spanish people. Thus, sovereignty cannot be 
 
To overcome this it is necessary to constitutionalize the territories as constituent 
bodies of the Spanish constitutional democracy, as proposed the Spanish Council of State 
(Consejo de Estado) in its Report on constitutional amendment (2006, 128), but also to 
denationaliz
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of the sovereign Spanish People, as well as the indissoluble character of the unity of the 
Spanish Nation. Both are incompatible with federalizing sovereignty and constitutionalizing 
secession. This is only possible under the formula of transforming Spain into a formal federal 
State, not necessarily into a confederation, at least if federation and confederation are 
differentiated by its constitutional or international law (treaty) foundations (Kelsen 1925, 
198). As has been said, International Law does not grant a secession right as expression of the 
external self-determination of ethnic groups in constitutional democracies like Spain, and 
therefore the secession clause in the case of Spain should not be the expression of the will of 
sovereign peoples bound within a confederation, as for instance is the case of the Republic of 
Karakalpakstan confederated by international treaties with the republic of Uzbekistan (arts. 
74-75 Const. Rep. Uzbekistan). On the contrary, whatever the federated States (current 
Autonomous Communities) or the Federation may do can only find its legal foundation in the 
constitutional provisions of the total constitution of the federal State (Kelsen 1925, 199-200), 
which can accept federal 
amendment procedure, submitted to the formal and substantial limitations that the federal 
Constitution may impose upon it, in similar fashion to the secession of the Island of Nevis 
from the Federation St Kitts & Nevis (art. 115 Const. St. Kitts & Nevis) or the unilateral veto 
power that some federal Constitutions, like the US one, grant the federated States (already 
Jellinek 1882, 272). Unlike Tosi (2007, 308), we do not consider secession a pre-legal right of 
federated States, which can only be exercised as an original constituent power thereof, but as 
the result of the exercises of a constituted amending power provided by the sovereign federal 
Constitution in order to harmonize democratic pluralism and constitutional stability.  
 
3.2. The secession clause 
 The aim of the proposed secession clause is to grant to the territorial collectivities 
existing in Spain a democratically managed and legal procedure for exercising the right to 
external self-determination, which could put an end to the binding force of the Spanish 
Constitution in the seceding territories. The issue at stake is therefore whether the seceding 
territory wishes to become a sovereign State, independent from the mother State, or not, a 
clear question as has been formulated by Sec. 1.3 Clarity Act, Sc. 2000, c.26 for Canada and 
Quebec s secession, or by the Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the 
Scottish Government on a referendum on independence for Scotland of 15th October 2012.  
Precisely due to the effects of secession on the territorial scope of validity of the 
Spanish Constitution is why the secession clause has to be introduced in Title X as an 
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extraordinary constitutional amendment procedure. It would work as  paramount law for the 
constitutional review of any step given towards secession without respecting the formal or 
material requirements established in the secession clause, helping  thus to implement a 
judicial review of a political issue like most constitutional issues.  
To propose a fixed and detailed constitutional regulation of a future secession clause 
goes beyond the limits of this paper, but we will try to provide the directives frameworking 
the secession procedure. The secession clause should address at least the following three 
aspects: who could launch the secession procedure and how it could be launched, which 
democratic bodies should take the decision and with which majority it should be taken, and 
whether there should be any negotiation before taking the final decision of seceding. The 
drafting of the secession clause should clarify all these aspects balancing the need to legalize 
the path to secession, the respect for the democratic will of the majorities and minorities 
within the seceding territory and within the whole State, as well as preventing secession from 
being used to blackmail the federal institutions regarding ordinary politics (Weinstock 2001, 
196). 
 The secession procedure does not need to be launched as a remedy to any injustice 
caused by the federal Government (Buchanan 2013, 212). It can be launched by the 
empowered territorial institutions whenever they can democratically express through the 
foreseen procedure the clear and present will of their citizens to secede, without the previous 
consent of any arbitral institution such as the Constitutional Court- deciding on the causality 
of the secession expectations (Buchanan 2013, 221-222). The Constitutional Court would 
only be able to review the constitutionality of the procedure and constitutional conditions for 
implementing secession, nothing else. 
 3.3 The secession procedure 
 The difficult issue of defining who should be legitimized to launch and finally take the 
decision to secede in historically so heterogeneous pluri-ethnic States, like Spain, requires two 
questions to be answered: which territorial collectivities should be constitutionally 
empowered to launch and decide on the secession procedure and which governmental bodies 
of those territorial collectivities should take the relevant decisions (Buchanan 2013, 223).  
 Regarding the first question, it has to be said that, if constitutionalizing secession 
wants to remain the State s recognition of a procedure for the external self-determination of 
the peoples comprising it, the launching of it and the final decision on the secession should be 
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taken by the different territorial peoples composing Spain and not by the whole Spanish 
People. Trying to combine this element with the whole Spanish constitutional system, it 
seems reasonable to identify those territorial peoples with the same criteria followed by the 
current Spanish Constitution in 1978 for recognizing the right to political autonomy (likely to 
be followed in a formal federalization of Spain). This would lead to recognition of the right to 
initiate secession of all existing Autonomous Communities in Spain (future federated States). 
This would reach a democratic balance between the ethnic (objective) and the will 
(subjective) criteria to define the peoples that might wish to secede. Unlike what happens with 
the generalization of the right to political autonomy that took place in Spain in the early 
1980s, this solution should not be criticized for being a coffee for all  solution, because the 
proposed constitutional configuration of the secession procedure grants a fully independent 
decision to secede by all territorial collectivities, and this would actually have a special value 
only for those whose strong national identity could make this option for secession more 
likely, regardless of the fact that other territorial collectivities also have this option open. 
 Regarding the second question, constitutional democracies require that there must be 
Parliaments and electoral bodies of the seceding territories who express the people's will to 
launch the secession procedure and eventually secede. However in order to balance the 
already existing political unity with the mother State, the required debate and deliberation in 
the seceding territory, as well as the expectation of a clear and sufficient majority in favor of 
secession, the secession procedure should run in a two-step way, with a negotiation phase in 
between. In each step the participating bodies will be different and also the required 
majorities, in order to achieve a balance between discouraging secession (or even using it to 
blackmail and take advantage in ordinary politics) and allowing territorial peoples to 
democratically decide to abandon political union with the mother State. 
 The first step of the secession procedure involves launching the initiative to secede. 
The will to secede should be expressed by a qualified majority of the Parliament of the 
seceding territory, under the condition that the proposal to start the secession procedure has 
been included by all the political parties supporting it in the Parliament in their electoral 
programs for the previous election to the regional Parliament. Although a majority for 
secession is not easy to obtain in well-established democracies (Dion 1966, 269), a clear and 
adequate majority could be 2/3 of the members of the territorial Parliament. This qualified 
majority would preclude blackmailing conduct regarding ordinary federal politics (Weinstock 
2001, 196), as well as protect dissenting minorities in the seceding territory by giving them a 
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strong blocking position; in other words, it would protect deliberation in a constitutional 
democracy (Norman 2003, 217-218; Sunstein 1991, 666). As an alternative, a lower majority 
of 3/5 of the Members of the territorial Parliament could be required, but adding to it the need 
to have the direct consensus of the people of the seceding territory expressed in a plebiscite -a 
voting on the political issue of whether the secession procedure should be launched or not- 
passed with a 3/5 majority of the electors (not the voters) in favor of launching the secession 
procedure. However, experiences such as Quebec s show that popular consultations on such 
politically dividing issues as secession produce too many internal tensions within the 
population of the seceding territory and of the federal State (Dion 2013) and open wounds 
that would take a long time to heal. Therefore, we prefer the first alternative of a higher 
majority in the territorial Parliament and leave the people s consultation only to the final 
decision on the secession. 
 Once the decision to start the secession procedure has been approved, and before the 
second and final step, a deliberative federal democracy should attempt to avoid secession by 
bringing both parties (the federal Government and the seceding Government) to a negotiation 
phase. Following the terms established by art. 50 of the European Union Treaty both parties 
should negotiate for at least two years in order either to find an alternative constitutional 
arrangement  that avoids secession or to agree on the political, economic and legal conditions 
of secession. There would be a constitutional duty to negotiate, but if after two years an 
agreement could not be reached the Government of the seceding territory would be 
nonetheless allowed to proceed to the second step of the secession procedure and take the 
final decision on secession.  
Although Constitutional Courts find it difficult to be recognized by both parties as 
legitimate referees on the debatable issues that may arise in the negotiation, they are the only 
reasonable judges of this match and no other institution could play that role for two reasons. 
First, because it would be almost impossible to find any adequate arbitrating institution that 
could be recognized as legitimate by both parties. Secondly, because if the proposed 
institution is the European Union it is less likely that it would or even could legally accept 
such a refereeing role, as long as art. 4.2 of the European Union Treaty demands  that the EU 
respect the national identity of the member States, inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government, and this includes 
decisions on their territorial integrity (Medina Guerrero 2014, 106). Anyway, the 
Constitutional Court should be allowed to review only respect for the constitutional 
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conditions of the secession procedure, which would include: the legitimate bodies for starting 
or deciding secession, the required majorities, compliance with the duty to negotiate and 
respect for the fixed terms, etc , but would not adjudicate on the legitimacy of the decision 
to secede as a political issue.  
  
 If it proved impossible to reach an agreement avoiding secession, in the second step of 
the secession procedure the seceding territory would be constitutionally allowed unilaterally 
to take the final decision on secession and therefore put an end to the efficacy of the Spanish 
Constitution in its territory. In this step of the procedure the decision should be taken by the 
electorate of the seceding territory in a referendum. This would be in line with the 
implementation of instruments of direct democracy in the constitutional amendment 
procedures, as is the case of the amendment referendum (this time voted by the whole Spanish 
people) established by art. 168 SC for total amendments or amendments affecting the 
fundamental principles.  
 Regarding the majority required to approve the secession referendum, a qualified 
majority of 3/5 of the electors (not of the voters) would reasonably balance the clear 
democratic will of a territorial people to secede and the rights of the dissenting unionist 
minority, a balance that is one of the justifications for entrenchment in constitutional 
democracies (Otto y Pardo 1987, 58). Regarding the question about which 3/5 of the 
electorate should be reached for the approval, the answer must be: 3/5 of the electorate of the 
whole seceding territory, not of each one of its administrative districts (provinces in the case 
of Spain). At least that should be so if constitutionalizing a secession procedure aims to 
legalize the external desire for self-determination of the territorial peoples comprising Spain, 
not the will of administrative districts the whole State could be divided into. If one part of the 
seceding territory does not feel comfortable within this territorial unit, in federal States it is 
usually able to launch a territorial re-organizing procedure. Thus for instance, art. 29 of the 
German Constitution or art. 53 of the Swiss Constitution, but also Interim Provision Nr. 4 SC 
regarding the integration of Navarra in the Basque Country. But this re-organization must be 
decided by the federal Government besides and before the secession procedure has been 
launched. Anyway a 3/5 majority of the electors of the seceding territory together with the 
previous procedural requirements set by the secession clause grant with a high degree of 
certainty the dissemination of the secession expectation not only among the population but 
also among the different parts of the seceding territory. 
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 If launching the secession procedure fails to convince 3/5 of the electorate in the initial 
plebiscite, or if the final decision on secession is not approved with the 3/5 majority of the 
electors, it would be reasonable to set a 16-year exclusion term, during which no secession 
proposal could be launched in that territory, in order to relax the social tensions inherent to 
secession debates. If suffrage is democratically extended to citizens over 16, the length of this 
exclusion term is related to the incorporation of a new generation of voters to the society of 
the seceding territory, which should be given the opportunity to re-discuss the territorial 
organization framework within the federal State, according to the Jeffersonian ideal of a 
periodical renewal of the people s consent to the Constitution by any new generation. 
 If secession is finally approved by 3/5 of the electorate of the seceding territory, the 
federal Constitution will no longer be applicable in that territory. That does not necessarily 
apply to the efficacy of the federal Constitution over the people of the seceded territory, as 
long as according to art. 11.3 SC and art. 24 Spanish Civil Code the Spaniards living in a 
seceded territory cannot be deprived of Spanish nationality whenever they express their will 
to keep it (Sagarra i Trias 2014, 13). The agreed rules between Spain as mother State and the 
new seceded State on State s succession should determine if double nationality is allowed and 
under which conditions, or if not, how is the right to opt for one or another nationality to be 
exercised by the Spanish citizens living in the seceded territory in order to avoid loss of 
Spanish nationality against their will (for instance in case of automatic attachment of the 
nationality by the new seceded State without option to choose), because that would be a case 
of deprivation  thereof.  
Whether the seceded territory becomes a viable sovereign State or not is not a legal 
but a factual issue, as has been outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in Quebec s case 
(Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 274), and depends on elements such 
as the efficacy of the new State s power over its population and territory, but not on any legal 
decision of the mother State. It does not even depend on recognition by other States, which, 
according to the Consulting Opinion Nr. 1 of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference 
on Yugoslavia (Badinter Committee) of 1991 or art. 1 of the Montevideo American 
Convention on rights and duties of the States, of 26 December 2993, has only a declarative 
nature, not a constitutive nature of the State, even though such recognition by members of the 
international Community would help to strengthen the building of an effective State s power.  
Moreover, from a monist understanding of the legal system, on top of which   is the 
law of the federal mother State is, the surrounding States or territories aiming to become 
States are mere facts (Schilling 1994, 300). In this sense, although the implementation of the 
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secession clause is for the seceded territory a final legal event of the federal State, its legal 
effects end with the reductive delimitation of the territorial scope of the federal Constitution 
and do not apply to the prospective State built upon the seceded territory. The enactment of a 
new State s Constitution is beyond the scope of the secession clause and belongs to the 
kingdom of the original constituent power of the seceded territory, whose Grundnorm is the 
secession clause founding the legal competence of this power to enact a new Constitution 
(Tosi 2007, 313).   
 
4. Imposing material conditions upon secession? 
 A last question raised by the constitutionalizing of a secession clause is whether the 
exercise of the secession procedure could be conditioned to any material constraints, 
especially in order to safeguard the fundamental rights of the defeated minorities in the 
seceded territory. That would be the case of any required commitment to the fundamental 
rights of individuals and groups in the future seceded State, such as the principles and values 
expressed by art. 2 of the European Union Treaty or the fundamental rights according to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. According to what we have explained before (in 2.1) nothing prevents the 
Spanish constitutional amending power from establishing such material conditions to a future 
secession clause. Once again, the prospective secession right exercised through it would not 
be a pre-legal right of the territories but a new constitutional amending power subject to the 
conditions established by the Spanish federal Constitution. However, we should analyze if 
imposing such material conditions would be according to the objective and sense pursued by a 
secession clause. 
 Indeed, the entrenched procedure (especially the qualified majorities, the call for a 
referendum and the need to negotiate for at least two years) designed by the proposed 
secession clause itself  implies a democratic safeguard of the rights of dissenting minorities 
within the seceding territory, but it does not guarantee its future respect by the new State 
following secession. However, imposing material conditions legally binding- upon secession 
does not  seem to be the right way to grant the democratic commitment of the new State to the 
human rights and the democratic principles, without at the same time opposing the external 
self-determination role a constitutionalized secession clause is intended to play. A different 
issue would be to consider the original constituent power (in this case of the seceded territory) 
as bound by substantial limitations derived from natural law and from human rights 
international law (Roznai 2013, 557, 571, 583), but this is a methodological approach to the 
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understanding of law and the Constitution that we have already disregarded from a formal 
normativist point of view (Aláez Corral 2000, 246).  
In fact, the main reason for constitutionalizing secession is to give a legalized and 
democratic way-out to the external self-determination expectation of the peoples coexisting in 
multi-ethnic States, like Spain, and therefore it is up to them to decide even in an entrenched 
manner- unilaterally about secession. This goal would be frustrated if the mother State could 
condition the exercise of the constituent power by the seceded territory to a supervised 
compromise to comply with certain principles and values. No legal sovereignty would be 
obtained through secession if such material constraints remained binding during the post-
secession State-building phase. Besides this, even if those material constraints are foreseen by 
the secession clause, it would not be easy to implement them and grant its legal binding force. 
A repressive ex post judicial review would deny the main effect of the secession clause, which 
is secession and therefore legal independence; and a preventive ex ante judicial review, before 
the electorate of the seceding territory would be nonsense, because what matters is what the 
seceded people do after they have accomplished secession, not the promise to a future 
commitment to respect some values and principles. 
 However, a middle way between not establishing material conditions and establishing 
legally binding material conditions could be found. The secession clause could establish that 
the final question put to the electorate for the secession decision should include the political 
commitment ession- to apply to become a Member State 
of the European Union, according to art. 49 of the European Union Treaty, as long as 
secession implied that the seceded territory no longer belonged to the European Union 
(Mangas Martín 2013, 58). This would imply the current respect for the values referred to in 
art. 2 of the European Union Treaty -respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities, but also prevalence of pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men- as well as commitment to promoting 
those values (Medina Ortega 2013, 97). This commitment to apply for membership of the 
European Union would only be politically binding for the Governmental Institutions of the 
seceded territory and could not be legally checked or reviewed by the mother State. Its 
checking would correspond to the electorate of the seceded State and the political control 
implemented through the presidential or parliamentary elections. It would not legally prevent 
a withdrawal of the application by the new seceded State or the rejection of the application by 
non-recognition as a sovereign State and/or the veto of any Member State (including the 
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mother State), as long as according to art. 49 of the European Union Treaty a unanimous 
consent of the European Council is required to accept any new Member.  
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